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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state to the United 
States on the ability of the country to attract foreign loans. The key difficulty in determining a 
causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the leader’s trips abroad may attract 
foreign loans, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit countries known to be major 
creditors. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable for 
the number of leader’s trips. The instrument is urban distance defined as the gap between the 
level of urban development in the country of the leader relative to that in the United States. 
We conduct a 2SLS where the urban distance serves as a source of exogenous variation in 
leader’s trips. The estimation provides evidence of a statistically significant positive 
coefficient of leader’s trips. This result implies that these trips by the leaders signal to the 
creditors their commitment to use the borrowed funds properly and to repay these funds in 
due time. Our results are robust even after the inclusion of other control variable, using 
alternative samples, and accounting for the potential of instrument weakness. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the number of foreign trips by the leader of the 
country or the head of the government to the United States on external debt. To be specific, 
this paper investigates whether foreign travel by a country's leader allows the country to be 
able to borrow more loans from foreign entities. This is the first attempt in the literature to 
consider the number of trips by heads of state as a determinant of external debt. 
The intuition is straightforward. Leaders and heads of governments travel abroad for a 
plethora of purposes. One of the most important reasons is to seek economic assistance by 
either attracting foreign capital, bringing foreign aid or borrowing foreign loans. In the 
context of this paper, these foreign trips allow the leaders to present to potential public and 
private foreign creditors the projects that need to be financed in their countries, to persuade 
them to extend a loan to their country with concessionary terms, to highlight the future 
benefits of this loan to both countries, and to reassure these lenders of the creditworthiness of 
the country in terms of its ability to repay the principal and the interest in due time. Foreign 
officials can also take the trip of the head of the state as a strong signal from the highest levels 
of a country's leadership for their serious commitment to use foreign funds to finance projects 
that will benefit their country, and as a reassurance for the repayment of the loan. The leader’s 
visit to the United States, in particular, may also offer other creditors around the world a 
signal of a high credit rating of the country. Thus, we would expect that the number of 
leaders’ trips to be positively associated with external debt. 
On the other hand, the travel of the head of the government is costly. A large entourage 
usually accompanies the leaders when they travel, which include security personnel, policy 
makers, public officials, presidential cabinet staff, the press corps and others. The need to 
cover the cost of traveling, lodging, security, transportation, and meetings of the leaders and 
their retinue cause these trips to be a budgetary burden. Thus, the leaders’ trips can reallocate 
resources away from productive spending that is essential for a country in need of borrowing. 
These trips can also send a negative signal as it reflects how the leadership of the country is 
administering its finances, and displays a lack of fiscal discipline and austerity in a country in 
need of borrowing. In this case, creditors would be reluctant to extend loans. Thus, we would 
expect the leaders’ trips to have an adverse effect on attracting foreign loans. 
Given that the effect of the number of leaders’ foreign trips on external debt is 
inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a 
novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader to the United States of America, 
which is derived from the archives of the U.S. Department of State. This paper examines the 
effect of that variable on external debt. The key difficulty in determining a causal effect of the 
number of leader’s trips to the United States on external debt is the issue of endogeneity. As 
much as the leader’s trips may attract foreign loans, it is also possible that leaders are tempted 
to visit countries whose public and private creditors are known to extend loans to foreign 
countries. In this case, the United States is one of the countries with a significant outflow of 
private and public foreign loans. Thus, leaders would be tempted to visit the United States to 
borrow. This indicates an issue of reverse causality.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use a novel instrumental variable, which we 
refer to as urban distance. This instrument captures the gap between the level of urban 
development in the leader’s country and that of the United States. The Two Stage Least 
Squares estimation, where the leader’s trips variable is instrumented by urban distance, shows 
that the leaders’ trips variable has a statistically significant positive effect on external debt. 
Our result is robust even after the inclusion of additional control variables, after excluding 
countries that have benefited from HIPC and those that have experienced debt distress, and 
after accounting for the potential of instrument weakness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures 
are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the political determinants of external debt. As 
much as there is a plethora of studies that focus on the economic determinants of foreign debt, 
there is a new burgeoning literature that specifically focuses on the effect of the system of 
governance and political institutions on the accumulation of foreign debt. For instance, 
William Easterly (2002) argues that governments become deeply indebted because they 
borrow in order to keep themselves in power. The author also adds that “Debt relief is futile 
for governments with unchanged long-run preferences (i.e., governments that continue to be 
dominated by rent-seeking elites).” This shows that there is a connection between the form of 
government and their decision to borrow from foreign entities. 
Oatley (2010) argue that foreign indebtedness is a product of the impact of regime type 
on government borrowing decisions. The author predicts that autocratic regimes will borrow 
more from foreign creditors and invest less of these funds in public goods than democratic 
governments. The analysis substantiates this prediction and shows that autocratic countries 
accumulated substantially larger foreign debt compared to democratic ones. Jalles (2011) 
examine the effect of the quality of governance, in particular the control of corruption and the 
level of democracy, on external debt and economic growth. The authors show that less corrupt 
countries seem to be able to administer their debt better, and the level of debt at which the 
effect of debt on economic growth becomes negative is higher in countries with less 
corruption. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) examine the role of political institutions in 
explaining defaults on debt obligations. The authors show that in democracies, a 
parliamentary system or sufficient checks and balances guarantee the absence of default on 
external debt when economic fundamentals or liquidity are strong. 
Choi and Luo (2019) examine the effect on foreign debt of the legislative constraints on 
the executive. The authors argue that the executive is the only actor who seeks to increase 
government expenditure, while the legislature acts as a political barrier to the executive’s 
spending desires. The authors find that foreign borrowing is likely to increase at both low and 
high levels of legislative constraints, but likely to decrease at moderate levels. Arezki and 
Bruckner (2012) examine the effects of the windfalls caused by commodity price booms on 
external debt. The authors find that increases in the international prices of the exported 
commodity lead to a significant decline in the level of external debt in democracies but not in 
autocracies. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by arguing that it is not only the features of the 
system of governance that will affect the burden of external debt, but also the characteristics 
of those who are at the head of the system of governance, or the country’s leaders. These 
characteristics are shaped by their background and experiences. Thus, we study the effect of 
one of the most impactful experiences of leaders, which is foreign travel to creditor countries 
and in particular the United States of America. It is worth mentioning that this is part of our 
effort to examine the effect of leader’s foreign travel on other economic and political 
outcomes such as foreign investment inflows in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020a), and 
democracy in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020b). 
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. The 
dependent variable in our analysis is debt stock as a percentage of Gross National Income, or 
debt stock as a percentage of exports. Both variables are derived from the World 
Development Indicators.   
The variable of interest is leaders' trips as the number of trips by the government's 
leader to the United States of America during the period 1960-2015. This data is derived from 
the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of Sate of the United States 
of America.1 Figure 1 shows a world map of leader’s trips to the United States during the 
period 1960-2015. Initially, the objective was to use the total number of leaders’ trips to all 
countries. However, the unavailability of this type of data did not allow us to have such a 
distribution. Thus, we only consider leaders’ trips to one of the main creditors, which is the 
United States. This fact can justify our focus on travel by leaders to the United States. Several 
control variables are used in the analysis. Appendix A presents the source and description of 
all the variables used in this study. 
4. Estimation  
4.1. Baseline Results 
We conduct an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of leaders’ trips to the 
United States of America on external debt during the period 1960-2015. To explore this 
relationship we use the following equation 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (1) 
Debti is debt stock as a percentage of Gross National Income, or debt stock as a 
percentage of exports, in country i. LeadersTripsi is the number of trips by the leader of 
country i to the United States. ℵi is a vector of control variables and μi is the error term. The 
vector of control variables includes those commonly identified in the literature as 
determinants of external debt. Thus, we control for the logarithm of GDP per capita, annual 
GDP growth rate, fixed capital formation, consumer price inflation, and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP. The study is a cross-country analysis and applies the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique since our variable of interest is only 
available in cross-section. The OLS estimation, in column 1 of table 2, shows that the leaders' 
trips variable does not have a statistically significant coefficient.  
4.2. Endogeneity 
                                                          
1
 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory. 
The OLS estimation assumes that the leaders’ trips are exogenous to external debt. 
However, the problem of endogeneity cannot be ignored. First, the association may be 
spurious due to the failure to account for an unobserved factor, which is affecting both 
variables. Second, our leader’s travel variable only considers travel to the United States which 
is one of the countries with a significant outflow of foreign loans. Thus, political leaders 
would tend to go there. This means that as much as a higher frequency of leader’s trips can 
attract more foreign loans, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to travel to countries 
known to be major lenders. This highlights the possibility of reverse causality.  
To deal with this issue, we need a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips by 
using an instrumental variable approach. We use a novel instrument that we call urban 
distance, defined as the logarithm of the degree of urban development in country i divided by 
the logarithm of the degree of urban development in the United States. We measure the 
degree of urbanization by the urban land area in square kilometers. This identification strategy 
is based on the intuition that the gap between the urban development in the leader’s country 
and that in the United States justifies a leader’s trip to the U.S.A. The less urbanized the 
country the more the leader will be tempted to travel to the United States to enjoy the urban 
amenities and to take advantage of the ample business opportunities in the urban centers of 
one of the most developed countries. In addition, government agencies and private banking 
facilities are usually concentrated in urban areas. This is to say that urban centers allow for the 
possibility of concluding economic, financial and commercial transactions.  
Figure 2 illustrates the unconditional relationship between the leaders’ trips and urban 
distance. The graph shows a positive association, which implies that the larger the difference 
between urban land area in the country of the leader and that of the U.S.A, the larger the 
number of leader’s trips to the United States. This relationship is conditionally described as 
follows 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (2) 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 is the leader’s trips in country i, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  is the urban distance in 
country i and ℵ𝑖 is a vector of controls. Equation (2) constitutes the first stage in our Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is used as a source of exogenous 
variation in 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖. Table 2 shows the effect of leaders’ trips on external debt, 
corrected for endogeneity. Column 2 of table 2 shows the results of the second stage of the 
2SLS using debt stock as a percentage of Gross National Income, while column 3 shows the 
results using debt stock as a percentage of exports.  
The first step in the estimation suggests that the instrument is valid. The results also 
show that there is a causal and positive effect of the number of leader’s trips on external debt. 
The coefficient of the leaders’ trips variable is 28.433 when we use debt stock as a percentage 
of GNI as our dependent variable, and is 163.887 when we use debt stock as a percentage of 
exports. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the number of leaders' trips to 
the United States translates into an increase in external debt by 483.04 in the first case and by 
2784.23 in the second.  
4.3 Robustness 
We also conduct several tests to check the robustness of our results. Table 3 shows the 
2SLS estimation results with alternative samples. In the top panel of table 3, we have the 
results when we exclude countries that benefitted from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HIPC initiative, which aims at providing relief to the world poorest countries from heavy debt 
burdens2.  The results confirm that the coefficient of the leader’s trips to the United States is 
statistically significant and positive when we use debt stock as a percentage of Gross National 
Income, but insignificant in the case when we use debt stock as a percentage of exports.  
                                                          
2
 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc,  and 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-
Poor-Countries-Initiative 
 
In the bottom panel of table 3, we exclude countries that went through an episode of 
debt distress as identified by Kraay and Nehru (2006). Debt distress episodes are defined as 
“periods in which countries resort to any of three forms of exceptional finance: significant 
arrears on external debt, Paris Club rescheduling, and nonconcessional International Monetary 
Fund lending.” The results show that the coefficient of the leader’s trips to the United States is 
statistically significant and positive when we use debt stock as a percentage of Gross National 
Income, but insignificant in the case when we use debt stock as a percentage of exports. 
In table 4, we control for other factors to confirm our previous findings. We add other 
control variables such as total natural resource rents. This variable is included because the 
revenue generated from the extraction and exports of natural wealth leads to a lower 
dependence on foreign borrowing. We also add institutional factors such as the fraction of 
years under democracy and constraints on the executive. As shown in our literature survey, 
there are studies that associate political institutions and the system of governance with the 
level of indebtedness.  
The top panel of table 4 shows the results when we use debt stock as a percentage of 
Gross National Income. The results show that the coefficient is statistically significant and 
positive in all specifications. The bottom panel shows the results when we use debt stock as a 
percentage of exports. In this case, the coefficient loses its significance in all specifications. 
These results confirm that our finding of a positive coefficient of the leader’s trips 
variable is robust in the case when we use debt stock as a percentage of Gross National 
Income, but not in the case when we use debt stock as a percentage of exports. This could be 
attributed to the fact that the leader’s trips can have a positive effect on attracting foreign 
loans and on exports as well. If the leaders succeed in attracting foreign loans during their 
visit to the United States, it is also possible that they are able to conclude trade agreements 
that allow their country to export more.  
The next set of robustness tests is conducted to assess whether the instrumental variable 
used in the analysis is weak. If the instrument is weak, the estimated coefficient of interest 
could be biased towards OLS even if the instrument is weakly correlated with the error term. 
In this case, there is an agreement in the literature to use Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimation. Therefore, to account for potential instrument weakness, we 
estimate our relationship of interest using the Fuller (1977) version of LIML. This is 
considered more robust than the 2SLS in the presence of weak instruments, as shown in the 
simulations in Hahn et al. (2004), and also has lower small-sample variability than LIML.  
The results of the Fuller’s Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimation are 
shown in table 5. The top panel of table 5 excludes countries that benefitted from the HIPC 
initiative and those who experienced debt distress episodes. Fuller’s LIML estimates confirm 
our previous findings. The results in the top panel show that the coefficient of the leader’s 
trips to the United States is statistically significant and positive when we use debt stock as a 
percentage of Gross National Income, but insignificant in the case when we use debt stock as 
a percentage of exports. The bottom panel of table 5 shows the Fuller’s LIML results after the 
inclusion of additional control variables, which also confirm our previous findings. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state on the 
ability of the country to attract foreign loans. To deal with potential endogeneity, we 
introduce a novel instrumental variable for the number of leader’s trips. The instrument is 
urban distance defined as the gap between the level of urban development in the country of 
the leader relative to that in the United States. We conduct a 2SLS where the urban distance 
serves as a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips. The estimation provides evidence 
of a statistically significant positive coefficient of leader’s trips, which is robust even after the 
inclusion of other control variable, after using alternative samples, and after accounting for 
the potential of instrument weakness. This result implies that these trips by the leaders allows 
them to signal to the creditors their commitment to use the borrowed funds properly and to 
repay these loans in due time.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean     Std. Dev.      Min        Max 
Leaders' trips to USA 178   14.58989   16.98871   0   111 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 125   62.16884   46.64336   7.928189   333.6407 
External debt stocks (% of exports of 
goods, services and primary income) 124   258.8149   268.7986   26.01104   1683.39 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 148   22.18373   7.337477   10.72793   86.78394 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 143   36.55291   92.94395   1.544429   644.5441 
Log of GDP per capita 175   8.955041   1.204171   6.458339   11.67319 
GDP growth (annual %) 178   3.915802   2.079393   -1.490128   16.49753 
Urban Distance calculated by urban land 
area (sq. km) 149   -5.373651   2.029003   -12.30206   -.7452182 
Africa  168 .2797619   .4502241   0   1 
Americas  168 .172619   .3790474   0   1 
Asia  168 .2559524   .4376998   0   1 
Europa  168 .2261905   .4196146   0   1 
Oceania  168 .0654762   .2481037   0   1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: OLS and 2SLS Estimations. 
 
OLS 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
External debt stocks 
(% of GNI) 
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services 
and primary income) 
Leaders' trip to USA (log) -0.805 28.433** 163.887** 
 
(7.868) (12.187) (94.772) 
Log of GDP per capita -4.804 -10.139 -66.041* 
 
(7.932) (7.057) (39.428) 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.655** 5.840* -10.811 
 
(2.230) (3.159) (20.447) 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) -0.688 -0.403 6.415 
 
(0.533) (0.847) (5.006) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) -0.035 -0.008 0.433 
 
(0.053) (0.065) (0.535) 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.341 0.302 0.664 
 
(0.386) (0.386) (2.230) 
Continental effect Yes Yes Yes 
Cons 131.644* 54.117 222.575 
 
(74.561) (67.304) (242.795) 
  
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trip 
to US 
Urban Distance  
 
0.363*** 0.363*** 
  
(.094) (.094) 
F(excluded instruments) 
 
14.74 14.74 
First Stage R2 
 
0.5310 0.5310 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 
 
0.0473 0.211 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 
 
0.0312  0.170 
Number of observations 83 69 69 
R2 0.081 0.659  0.520 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: 2SLS Estimations with sample change. 
Sample : Exclusion HIPC country 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
External debt stocks (% of 
GNI) 
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services and 
primary income) 
Log Leaders' trip to USA 37.289* 164.908 
 
(19.663) (142.103) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Cons 30.062 174.624 
 
(84.058) (329.496) 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trip to US 
Urban Distance  .409*** .409*** 
 (.129) (.129) 
F(excluded instruments) 9.99 9.99 
First Stage R2 0.5419 0.5419 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.044 0.427 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 0.025 0.367 
Number of observations 54 54 
Sample : Exclusion Debt Distress 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
External debt stocks (% of 
GNI) 
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services and 
primary income) 
Log Leaders' trip to USA 38.300* 132.166 
 
(22.443) (168.507) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Cons 60.108 126.859 
 
(83.925) (290.996) 
 Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trip to US 
Urban Distance  .355** .355** 
 (.130) (.130) 
F(excluded instruments) 7.38 7.38 
First Stage R2 0.5990 0.5990 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.070 0.622 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 0.039 0.566 
Number of observations 47 47 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; all of the control variables in Table 2 are included in the estimates. For reasons 
of space, we have not included them in this table. 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: 2SLS Estimations with variables additionnels. 
 Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 
Log Leaders' trip to USA 24.739** 32.760** 44.788* 61.849* 55.099* 
 
(11.069) (14.574) (22.896) (34.417) (29.484) 
HIPC dummy -18.833* 
   
-11.215 
 
(10.931) 
   
(14.279) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
 
1.387 
  
0.910 
  
(0.916) 
  
(0.927) 
Fraction of year under democratic 
  
-84.743* 
 
-7.753 
   
(48.575) 
 
(47.245) 
Executive contraints 
   
-19.571* -14.368 
    
(11.345) (9.519) 
Cons 66.035 30.275 11.415 80.218 60.834 
 
(61.448) (72.532) (80.981) (73.896) (72.943) 
 Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trip to US 
Urban Distance .386*** .342*** .270*** .230*** .281*** 
 (.087) (.086) .091 (.089) (.096) 
F(excluded instruments) 19.50 15.58 8.82 6.61 8.51 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.082 0.049 0.050 0.020 0.019 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 0.056 0.031 0.031 0.011 0.008 
Number of observations 69 69 69 69 69 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) 
Log Leaders' trip to USA 136.921 171.318 219.857 276.474 207.554 
 
(90.022) (104.807) (146.230) (196.521) (184.581) 
HIPC dummy -137.464** 
   
-120.342* 
 
(52.849) 
   
(67.641) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
 
2.383 
  
-0.628 
  
(3.620) 
  
(3.494) 
Fraction of year under democratic 
  
-290.006 
 
-116.937 
   
(239.761) 
 
(178.067) 
Executive contraints 
   
-65.941 -27.332 
    
(55.903) (51.668) 
Cons 309.570 181.621 76.440 310.518 287.060 
 
(223.213) (256.268) (299.567) (309.288) (266.952) 
 Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trip to US 
Urban Distance .386*** .342*** .270*** .230*** .281*** 
 (.087) (.086) (.091) (.089) (.096) 
F(excluded instruments) 19.50 15.58 8.82 6.61 8.51 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.3672 0.215 0.221 0.172 0.303 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 0.3165 0.170 0.175 0.131 0.240 
Number of observations 69 69 69 69 69 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; all of the control variables in Table 2 are included in the estimates. For reasons 
of space, we have not included them in this table. 
 
Table 5. Accounting for instrument weakness of table 3 and 4: Fuller’s Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood estimates  
Table 3 
 
Exclusion HIPC country Exclusion Debt Distress 
 
 
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services 
and primary income) 
External 
debt stocks 
(% of GNI) 
External debt stocks (% of 
exports of goods, services 
and primary income) 
Extern
debt sto
(% of GNI)
Log Leaders' trip to USA 164.908 37.289** 132.166 38.
 
(126.806) (17.547) (147.476) (19.
Cons 174.624 30.062 126.859 60
 
(294.027) (75.009) (254.677) (73.
Number of observations 54 54 47 47
Table 4 
 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 
 Log Leaders' trip to USA 61.849** 44.788** 55.099** 
 
(31.281) (20.810) (26.083) 
Executive contraints -19.571* 
 
-14.368* 
 
(10.312) 
 
(8.421) 
Fraction of year under democratic 
 
-84.743* -7.753 
  
(44.149) (41.796) 
IPPTE 
  
-11.215 
   
(12.632) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
  
0.910 
   
(0.820) 
Cons 80.218 11.415 60.834 
 
(67.163) (73.603) (64.530) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 
 
 
External debt stocks (% of exports of goods, services and primary 
income) 
 Log Leaders' trip to USA 276.474 219.857* 207.554 
 
(178.617) (132.907) (163.290) 
Executive contraints -65.941 
 
-27.332 
 
(50.810) 
 
(45.708) 
Fraction of year under democratic 
 
-290.006 -116.937 
  
(217.918) (157.527) 
IPPTE 
  
-120.342** 
   
(59.839) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
  
-0.628 
   
(3.091) 
Cons 310.518 76.440 287.060 
 
(281.110) (272.274) (236.160) 
Number of observations 69 69 69 
 note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; all of the control variables in Table 2 are included in the estimates. For reasons 
of space, we have not included them in this table. 
  
Figure 1. World Map of Leader’s Trips 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Leaders’ Trips and Urban Distance  
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Appendix A. Data Sources 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Leaders' trips to USA Number of trips by heads of governments or state 
leaders to the USA during the period 1960-2015. 
https://history.state.gov/departm
enthistory 
 
Imports of goods and 
services as a 
percentage of GDP 
The value of imports as a percentage of GDP. World Bank WDI online 
Database 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1960-
2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Annual consumer 
price inflation 
Annual percentage change in consumer prices. World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Gross fixed capital 
formation as a 
percentage of GDP 
 World Bank WDI online 
Database 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
 
Fraction of years under 
democracy 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international 
$) 1960-2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database. 
 
Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) 
Total natural resources 
rents (% of GDP) 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil 
rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents. 1970-2015 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Urban land area (sq. 
km) 
Urban land area in square kilometers, based on a 
combination of population counts (persons), 
settlement points, and the presence of Nighttime 
Lights. Areas are defined as urban where 
contiguous lighted cells from the Nighttime Lights 
or approximated urban extents based on buffered 
settlement points for which the total population is 
greater than 5,000 persons. 1990-2010. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Africa Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Africa and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Asia Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Asia and 0 otherwise 
Own Calculation 
America Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a America and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Oceania Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Oceania and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Europe  Own Calculation 
   
 
 
